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to live in peace. Absence of freedom is the most horrid form of restlessness.

The Federal Government and with it all Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany feel in these days particularly close to the Germans in the Soviet-occupied zone. We are all aware of the obligation that we have explicitly taken upon us when adopting our Basic Law. We stated at the time that we acted also on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied. To the entire German people on both sides of the zonal border we addressed our appeal to complete in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany. Our fellow-citizens in the Soviet-occupied zone should even in these critical days not doubt for a moment that we shall never slacken in striving passionately for the attainment of this great objective. We are sure of the support of all free nations in the world, and we have no doubt that the legitimate national concern of the whole German people will find its fulfillment. The tenacious determination of all Germans in all parts of our country is a prerequisite to such success; no one in the world should ever doubt the determination and steadfastness of the Germans in this vital problem of our people.

The Free World Will Succeed

Let me finally say a few words to the inhabitants of the Eastern sector of Berlin and the Soviet zone of Germany. Your sorrow and suffering are our sorrow and suffering. In your particularly difficult situation you were able at least to derive some comfort from the thought that, if your lot should become quite unbearable, you could mend it by fleeing. Now it looks as if you had been deprived of this comfort, too. I request you with all my heart: do not abandon all hope of a better future for yourselves and your children. We are convinced that the Free World, and particularly we here, shall some day be successful in our efforts to obtain freedom for you. The right to self-determination will continue its victorious march throughout the world and will not halt at the boundary of the Soviet zone. Believe me, the day will come when you will be united with us in freedom. We do not stand alone in the world; justice is on our side, and so are all the nations who love freedom.

Internal War

THE NEW COMMUNIST TACTIC

By ROGER HILSMAN, *The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Washington, D. C.*

Delivered at Institute of World Affairs, San Diego, California, August 10, 1961

THE COLD WAR with Communist Russia has been with us for 16 years. And each year the Communist tactics are more subtle and complex. In the 1940's, it was simple: The Soviet policy of expansion and the American policy of containment. The threat of direct Communist aggression remains, but new, more sophisticated tactics are added every year.

To most Americans, the basic danger over the past decade has been the threat of all-out thermonuclear war. The threat remains. It does and should demand our careful, constant attention.

Next there has been the threat of "limited war"—old-fashioned, foot-slogging fighting on the ground—with artillery, machine guns, and grenades. This is the dirty, bitter business of direct, personal killing, as we knew it in Korea.

Limited wars and total war are closely linked. A limited war can be the escalator carrying the world right up to the mushroom clouds.

But even as we have pondered this connection—and have tried to prepare for both eventualities—the Communists have found what they regard as a new chink in our armor. The new tactic is internal war—using military force not across national boundaries, but inside them.

This newest concept is guerrilla war—or, to use a more accurate term, *internal* war.

It was this that President Kennedy had in mind in his speech to the nation two weeks ago when he said:

> ". . . We face a challenge in Berlin, but there is also a challenge in Southeast Asia, where the borders are less guarded, the enemy harder to find, and the dangers of Communism less apparent to those who have so little. We face a challenge in our own hemisphere."

Thus even while reheating the Berlin crisis, Khrushchev has stressed this third approach of internal war over and over again this past year. He sees the possibilities for internal wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the best way of using force to expand the Communist empire with the least risk. He argues that nuclear war is too disastrous even for Leninists. Apparently he has begun to have his doubts about even limited war on the Korean model.

We can take some credit for Khrushchev's change of heart. Our strategic force to deter nuclear war has paid its way. Our efforts to build ground forces, our alliances, and our sacrifices in Korea—the fact that we stood and fought—have all paid off.

In retrospect we can be proud of all this, though our pride should not lead to over-confidence. Moreover, we must beware of thinking that these different tactics were separate or unrelated.

Even in the early stages of the cold war, the Soviets manipulated internal wars in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Guatemala, and in vulnerable states in the Middle East. The Soviet leaders, bred as they were in an atmosphere of urban-based intrigue and revolutionary plotting, were pushed further in their thinking by the success of Mao Tse-tung's peasant-based Chinese Communist revolution.

New Developments

The result is that recently internal warfare has gained a new prominence in Soviet dogma. What Khrushchev calls "wars of liberation" or "just wars" are now considered the most promising paths to further expansion. The theory enables Moscow and Peiping to manipulate for their own purposes the political, economic, and social revolutionary fervor which is now sweeping much of the underdeveloped world. Since many governments are weak; since some are corrupt; since there is much injustice in the world; and since the Communist conspirators are well trained and supplied, it is usually fairly easy to start or take advantage of an internal war and to claim that years of blood and terror are in the people's interest. Even when a government tries to undertake reform and keep the peace—as in Venezuela or Colombia—the Communists chant that the government is "repressive" and redouble their efforts.

A second development is the flexibility and sophistication

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in tactics of guerrilla terror and subversion. The Soviets continue to sponsor Communist rebellions overtly wherever possible. They also do their best to infiltrate nationalist movements against colonialism. They try especially hard to capture the extreme nationalists like Lumumba. They sponsor radical nationalism wherever they can find it, for the more violence there is in a country, the greater the Communists' opportunity.

If a democratic nationalist government is in power, Communists will advise that it separate itself from the West and permit the Communists to have "equal democratic rights"—that is, positions of power in the government, freedom to propagandize, and the right to officer regular forces or their own militia.

If a colonial or reactionary government is in power, the Communists direct efforts along the entire spectrum of subversion. They foster discontent in the cities, leading to demonstrations and strikes, perhaps to riots and mob action. Here their targets are student groups, labor unions, and left wing intellectuals. In the countryside, they establish guerrilla forces in inaccessible regions, move to peasant areas, and, through a judicious mixture—on the Chinese Communist and Castro Cuban patterns—of social reform, administration, and sheer terror, establish a base of political rule. Whenever possible, in both urban and rural sectors, they endeavor to create "people's militias" as a device for organizing mass support to supplement their fulltime combatants. Thus they operate continuously to undermine an unfriendly government, and differ in their handling of popular nationalist regimes only in the degree of their effort to influence the government directly and infiltrate its power centers.

Let me repeat that this new Soviet emphasis on internal war does not mean that we can forget about the other, greater levels of war. Moscow's willingness to raise the Berlin issue indicates that their so-called "peaceful coexistence" does not rule out manufactured crises that run the risk of conventional or even nuclear war. In fact, they could not get away with internal war, except for the inhibitions imposed by these other two possibilities.

The great advantage of internal war is that it is less risky and less conspicuous than the more violent wars. It also involves techniques that the Communists feel they have mastered and we have not. We must also remember that Khrushchev is using his recently increased capacity to wage the more violent kinds of war to expand his freedom of maneuver in guerrilla war and to threaten escalation if we try to stop him.

In short, the so-called nuclear stalemate has not served to inhibit violence. If anything, it has enabled the Communists to resort to a wider variety of force. Their new strength in nuclear weapons makes them all the more tempted to adventure with internal war.

How can we help stop the Communists from destroying independent states from within? At President Kennedy's direction—as outlined in his second "State of the Union" message—steps have been taken in several parts of the government to meet this threat. The people in the Pentagon and we in the State Department have devoted special attention to it.

Let me take up the question of how we stop the Communists from destroying independent states from within under three headings: Military Security; Modernization and Reform; and Political Factors, especially those unique political factors undercutting a regime's stability.

Here we must be very hard-headed—for there are several all-too-popular misconceptions.

Military Security

In my judgment, it is nonsense to think that regular forces trained for conventional war can handle jungle guerrilas adequately. Yet in spite of some very hard lessons—Magsay—say in the Philippines, the British in Malaya, and the French in Indo-China and Algeria—we have been slow to learn.

Regular forces are vital to resist external aggression. But we must not be deluded by the desire of local generals' for "prestige hardware" or by the traditionalists belief that well-trained regulars can do anything.

Regular forces are essential for regular military tasks. But guerrilla warfare is something special. Conventional forces with heavy equipment in field formation tend to cluster together, centralizing their power on terrain that allows rapid movement. They rely on roads, consider strong points and cities as vital targets to defend, and so, when they do disperse, it is only to get tied down in static operations. In combat, rigid adherence to the principle of concentration keeps units at unwieldy battalion or even regimental levels, usually with erroneous stress on holding land rather than destroying enemy forces.

It is ironic that we Americans have to learn this military lesson again in the 20th century. Have we forgotten that we were the ones who had to teach the British regulars "Indian fighting" back when we were still a colony? Have we forgotten that we taught the British regulars another kind of lesson in "Indian fighting" during our own revolution?

We Americans have also forgotten that it was we who fought one of the most successful counter-guerrilla campaigns in history—in the Philippines back at the turn of the Century. We learned some fundamental military lessons then, and it is time we remembered them.

After Aguinaldo's Army was defeated and Aguinaldo himself captured, some of the extremists took to the hills to become guerrillas. And they were not alone. For 300 years the Spanish had been fighting a guerrilla war with bands of religious fanatics in the southern islands. And further south, in Mindinao, the Moro remained unconquered. All these roamed the jungles and mountains—raiding, ambushing, killing, and pillaging.

The Army tried to fight the guerrillas, but with little success. The enemy faded into the jungle, and the unwieldy regular units were too burdened with equipment, too slow to follow. Regulars needed supply lines. They could not live off the country or do without ammunition trains or hospital corps.

The regulars tended to establish a fixed base from which they sallied out. Thus the guerrilla always knew where they were and when their guard was lax. The stage was set for surprise attacks and massacre.

In fact, one of these massacres was famous in the old Army—second only to Custer's last stand. It occurred at Balangiga on the Island of Samar, and involved Company C of the Ninth Infantry, one of the finest regiments in the Army. At 6:40 a.m., the men were lined up before the cook shack, the opposite side of the parade ground from where their rifles were stacked. Suddenly the jungle came alive as 450 guerrillas charged. The regulars of Company C never had a chance. They fought barehanded. One soldier killed several men with a baseball bat before he was overwhelmed. The cook accounted for several more with a meat cleaver. But soon it was all over. Twenty-four men escaped. The rest were killed and mutilated.

But, finally, the United States found the solution to the guerrilla problem in the Philippines. We recruited native Filipinos—men wise to jungle ways, men who knew the trails and mountains as their own back yard. These were divided into small groups of 10, 15, 20, or 50 men, and over each group we put a trained American officer—a bold and determined leader.

This was the famed Philippine Constabulary and the history of their fabulous exploits is well worth reading. The story is told—and very well—in Vic Hurley's book, *Jungle*

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Patrol, published about 30 years ago.

The trick was constant patrolling over every trail, and careful attention to intelligence work. The jungle, nighttime, and surprise attack are the guerrilla's weapons. The solution is to adopt the same weapons to fight him.

During World War II our O.S.S. guerrilla battalion operated behind the enemy lines in Burma. Nothing pleased us more in those days than to have a regular Japanese force take out after us. They operated in large unwieldy units that were easy to ambush. Their movements were simple to follow through the mountains and jungle. We felt that our own existence was well justified when the Japanese had to take regular forces from front line fighting to chase a guerrilla unit. At one stage my outfit—consisting of four Americans and about 200 Burmese—kept a whole Japanese regiment of 3,000 men marching and counter-marching over the mountains far away from the front lines. What we would have feared far more were smaller groups patrolling steadily—especially cavalry.

In many parts of the world today counter guerrilla operations conducted by regular troops rely on the tactic of sweeps through the countryside like those of the Japanese regiments that chased our guerrilla battalion in Burma. The sweeps are too well publicized and too cumbersome to bring results. This tactic leads to antagonism between the regular troops and the population. Villagers fear reprisals and refuse their help. Soldiers sense they are in guerrilla territory and act accordingly toward the people. Military inadequacy leads to failure and so to defeat.

I also fear that in the past our military aid programs for countries fighting against guerrillas have often followed the mistaken assumption that all war is similar to the large-scale tank and artillery engagements so familiar in western Europe. The tactics of guerrilla warfare and the customs and culture of the peoples, it seems to me, should determine the proper weapons for counter guerrilla forces. For instance, the mountain tribes of Burma prior to World War II conducted their wars with long knives—a kind of sword called a "dah"—and with one-shot muzzle-loading flintlocks. Burma's mountainous regions are sparsely settled and the semi-nomadic inhabitants constantly move from one mountain valley to another when the soil begins to wear out. Consequently, they see no point in holding ground or in taking ground, and their whole history in war is one of lightning raids, sneak attacks, and ambushes.

Those of us in O.S.S. who tried to make our guerrilla troops attack a defended position or to stand by their own positions reaped only disaster. We had to adapt our weapons and our tactics to the terrain and to the customs of the people. I found that my own troops, accustomed to fighting with knives, would wait until the enemy was within arm's reach before firing their guns. I also found that they saw no point in sticking around after exhausting the first clip-load of ammunition. They were brave in sneaking up on an enemy; they were brave in holding their fire in an ambush until an enemy was upon them; but their fundamental maxim was that the wise soldier lives to fight another day. The Americans who thought their purpose was to stand and hold found themselves all alone in standing and holding.

The lesson was obvious, it seems to me. I equipped my men with submachine guns of .45 calibre. The men wanted to wait until the enemy was close before opening fire, and the jungle itself rarely permitted a shot ranging more than a few yards. I needed weapons with a large volume of fire power but neither range nor accuracy. I equipped my 8-man squads with 7 submachine guns and one light machine gun. One squad had 60 millimeter mortars to lay down an umbrella of fire to cover our withdrawal. Our tactics were traditional for guerrillas—we ambushed, we hit and we ran. This particular unit, operating behind the enemy line for six months, killed over 300 of the enemy, blew up many bridges and ammunition and supply dumps, and yet suffered less than a dozen casualties.

For effective counterguerrilla operations we need radical changes in organization, combat doctrine, and equipment. Our key units might be decentralized groups of fifty men, self-reliant and able to operate autonomously, fanned out into the countryside. The premium is on leadership, for only men of courage and great skill can make this system work; with such men, plus decent pay and training, counterguerrilla force should not be difficult to maintain.

The operational concept is as follows: A guerrilla-infested part of the country is marked off and divided into sections. Each section is patrolled by one of these units, but all are in contact with a central headquarters, which in turn has a reserve force at its disposal. Upon contacting guerrilas, a patrol alerts headquarters and adjacent patrols. As the latter converge, headquarters dispatches paratroops or helicopter transports behind the enemy, who is surrounded and destroyed. Once an area is pacified, the government consolidates its control and moves its forces on to the next section of land to be cleared. The main ingredients then are constant patrols, good communication facilities, rapid mobility, and a capacity for rapid concentration.

One further point. The operations must cause minimum harm to the people, lest they become antagonistic to the government. The troops must be highly disciplined to respect civilian rights and property. They should offer help (ranging from field repairs to Magsaysay's offer of legal services in the Philippines). Cargo planes should carry in supplies, so that the forces do not have to live off the countryside. The onus for anti-civilian behavior should be diverted squarely to the guerrillas themselves. They are the ones who are compelled to take to repressive measures, seizing rice or conscripting men in their desperation. As they lose popular support, they will have nothing to fall back on as they suffer military defeats.

Modernization and Reform

I hope that this last point indicates my awareness of how important it is to have popular support in conducting an internal war. Many observers argue that stability and physical security are basically political issues, depending on the popularity of governments. To this they add that economic development is the key to popular support, and the criterion by which regimes will be judged.

In the long run, popular support is essential for stable governments and a stable world. And there is no question that economic development, modernization, and reform, are key factors in creating popular support and stable governments. But in my judgment it would be mistaken to think that guerrillas cannot thrive where governments are popular and where modernization, economic development, and reform are going forward. And the usual corollary to this thought—the notion that the existence of guerrillas is proof positive that the government is unpopular and therefore not worth supporting—is even more mistaken. It is, in fact, defeatist. We need modernization, economic development and reform to defeat guerrillas. But other things are also needed.

Let me draw on my personal experience once more. When we fought in Burma, about 10 percent of the people were pro-West, another 10 percent were pro-enemy, and the rest were indifferent or turned inward towards their own family and village. Yet our guerrilla group performed with great success. We recruited men not only from the 10 percent who were pro-West, but also from the 80 percent who were indifferent. We gave no quarter to the enemy and his supporters, but we did everything we could to avoid creating hardship for

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the rest, and to help them when we could. We were careful to move around their growing crops. And when we had to ask them for food we paid or arranged an airdrop of double the amount of rice we took. Before the war was over it was the enemy and his supporters in the puppet government who appeared oppressive to the people—and not we guerrillas.

The idea that guerrillas thrive only where the government is unpopular may apply to the more developed parts of the world. But in many parts of the world, states are underdeveloped in the political-administrative sense as well as economically. The number of people are few who have the training to perform the standard civil service jobs that we take for granted. Lacking that "steel frame" in which India takes such just pride, a government appears as a weak and distant entity to most villagers, except when it serves as a burdensome tax collector. In most lands, at least half the people are indifferent to a government. Even the active elements, ranged for or against the regime, are not too set in their political commitments.

In these circumstances, maintaining the bare minimum of national services is enough to determine a nation's fate in the short run. In the Congo, the collapse of two supports—the military Force Publique and Belgian technical service—revealed how far the state has to go before becoming an administrative entity.

By contrast, the Somali Republic, which gained its independence at the same time last year also faced a potentially difficult situation—of keeping newly joined regions and powerful tribal groups satisfied. As matters developed, no pseudo-popular manifestation of discontent emerged, thanks in part to a small but efficient western-trained civilian police force.

As for modernization, although essential for the long haul, it cannot help much in a counterguerrilla program. Modernization inevitably uproots established social systems, produces political and economic dislocation and tension, and cannot deliver results quickly enough to relieve these short-term pressures.

However, there is mounting unrest in rural areas all over the world. What peasants increasingly crave is social justice and reform—at a minimum, the old way of life with the cruelties removed.

This includes reform of land tenure arrangements, reasonable rent, credit, and market facilities, and simple modern tools. They may see ahead to the value of urban centers that buy their produce—instead of importing from abroad and forcing them to raise crops for export—and in turn manufacture for their simple needs. Finally, they crave peace and physical security.

Yet there is a growing link between urban and rural unrest. As modernization begins, the poorer farmers drift to the city, there to form the hard core of the unemployed slum-dwellers who overtax the rudimentary metropolitan facilities. These unfortunates form the recruits for the city mobs that Communists and demagogues have been turning out in the Middle East and Latin America for the past 15 years. The political link between the two becomes clear when we see how the very poor are used as recruits for guerrilla forces in the rural areas and for "people's militia" in the urban regions. Communists have long made use of the former in sustaining a rebellion; Castro and "Che" Guevara have become adept at using both groups to support the present Cuban regime. In Latin America alone, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru come immediately to mind as countries where the combined urban-rural problem exists.

What is required first is a program of social reform. Very often the conservative element in a community will struggle irrationally against all reform. As a consequence, we have encountered in several parts of the world the amazing and suicidal spectacle of conservatives giving secret aid to the Communists in order to undermine modest reformist efforts.

Equally important is the need to indicate some effort and progress on the long path to modernization. Small results, if they prove the intent of a regime, can aspire faith that will outlast the distress of early change. Finally, where these efforts are combined with democratic government and mass party organization, the government can broaden its base of physical power.

In Venezuela, for example, the ruling party has been fostering reform and change. It has also created a national organization, with loyal popular militia elements to support it. Though not professionals, militiamen can keep the peace in the face of provocative demonstrations and can perform useful services in supplementing the work of regular forces. A government that cannot get its image across to the peasantry or mobilize peasant support will find its functions in both these endeavors usurped by the Communists.

To summarize my feeling on popularity, reform, and modernization: (1) they are important ingredients but are not the determinants of events, (2) their role must be measured more in terms of their contribution to physical security than we generally realize.

Other Political Factors

Let me hurriedly refer to several other variations on the theme of internal security—the political factors that threaten the stability of new states. So far we have noted primarily the nature of the Communist threat and the issues of good government and economic development. Unfortunately, on top of these universal problems, most states have to grapple with specific difficulties that create further divisions, induce tensions, and propel even the best intentioned regimes to violence. Among these difficulties are the following:

(1) *Antagonisms* between underdeveloped states. The familiar pattern of rivalry between neighbors, as old as history itself, exists with even greater intensity today because so many new states have suddenly sprung into being. Territorial claims and other sources of friction are still fresh, as in the Persian Gulf or India's northern border regions. Such difficulties generate tensions, arms races, and nationalistic fervor that Communists try to exploit.

(2) *Disagreements* between regions of a state or between a region and the center. The issues of regionalism in India; separatist movements in Indonesia, and tribalism in the fragmented Congo are examples of serious challenges to governmental authority and stability.

(3) *Social Class Antagonism.* It is characteristic of established economic elites that they feel themselves threatened from below and refuse to countenance the very reform that would ease the real dangers that they face. The great failures of old regimes in France before 1789 and Russia at the start of this century are but the outstanding instances of this historic problem that presents itself on almost every continent today.

(4) *Intense Disagreement Over Foreign Policy.* Iraq's adherence to the Baghdad Pact despite internal opposition and disapproval by all other Arab states is a case in point. Radical-nationalist African states accuse their neighbors of following a colonial, subservient line. In trying to get them on a comparable course, radical states engage in clandestine operations to subvert neighboring regimes or support opposition factions whose ideology resembles their own.

(5) *Traditional Political Rivalries Within a Social Class.* Colombia offers the leading example of two parties that, without basic social or ideological differences, became embroiled in a long civil war, so bitter as to cause over 250,000 casualties. This war literally superimposed itself on all the other problems of security that normally confront a developing state.

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The ruling party in Burma split into hostile factions in 1958 and the army had to act to keep that situation from fragmenting the country.

(6) *Lack of Popular Belief in the State as a Sovereign Entity.* In large areas of Africa and the Middle East, normal loyalties follow either tribal and provincial lines or grand dreams of regional African or Arab unity. The state does attract some loyalty because it is a going concern, one that can be used as a lever of power at both these other levels. With this overlapping of loyalties, it is only too easy for a government to meddle in the affairs of its neighbors and further weaken their internal cohesion—always, of course, in the belief that its cause is just.

(7) *Ethnic or Racial Issues.* Rebellious tribesmen are constant drains on national military power in various states throughout Asia and Africa. The Communists found in Malaya's Chinese community ready hands for their bloody insurrection, partly because of inter-racial political rivalries. Indians in some Latin American countries are living at very low standards, are beginning to stir, and are potential bait for a Communist ethnic-economic appeal. Central-African pagans have strained relations with Moslem Arab northerners in a crossroad land that is beset by outside pressures.

(8) *Banditry* is a cultural inheritance in many parts of the world. Bandits (or armed rural gangs) that flout the authorities and exploit local neighbors have long existed in many parts of the world—colored perhaps with varying degrees of political or ideological overtones, but essentially dedicated to violence. One thinks of recent illustrations in the Philippines, of traditional sporadic outbreaks in Java, of troubles experienced by the new state of Burma. These actions impoverish the peasant, ruin the government's authority, paralyze public morale and open the path to similar Communist tactics or, conversely, to establishment of Communist authority in that region.

(9) *Constitutional Crises.* Unconstitutional extension of presidential power, so often exemplified in the history of Latin America, is one example of a constitutional crisis that may lead to political turmoil when such excesses are traditionally resented and countered by violence. The seizure of power by a military junta is another.

There are other obvious factors, such as the outburst of nationalism that may follow independence, proximity to Sino-Soviet territory, the existence and strength of a Communist party and its orientation toward Moscow or Peiping, and of course revolts against colonial rule and white-minority rule in certain areas. The addition of just a few of these special hazards to the basic difficulties I described earlier places a tremendous strain upon a government's staying power. You can clearly see why I am saying that internal security is a problem in its own right and not simply a function of good government or economic growth.

Conclusion. There are many things we can do to help responsible and friendly governments attack this problem all along the line. I have already illustrated how the training of armed forces can be better geared to the specific war against guerrillas. Equally important is the training of police and other forces to cope with the lesser manifestations of violence, not only in detection and surveillance but also in handling actual outbursts. We may find ourselves encouraging reformers to organize mass parties, and in certain tense circumstances we may need to help create citizens' militia forces. We are seriously interested in broadening the will and capacity of friendly governments, to augment social and political reform programs as a basis for modernization.

We must also look for ways to ease the access of beleaguered states to outside assistance. The Communists use the concept of state sovereignty as a device to seal off a land from "intervention" once they have made sufficient inroads. They use international law, appeals to neutralist neighbors, the unpleasant reactions to what is called "Western imperialism," and the threat of force in this effort. We must foster the growth and use of international organizations as sources of help—help on all the problems I have mentioned, and help that can be on the scene and in action before the crisis reaches its peak. In this way we may ward off a showdown or at the very least have elements there to indicate outside support in being and on the way.

In any event the United States must be prepared to become deeply involved. This effort may be costly, but careful and early involvement is far less expensive or dangerous than a crash program. The Communists are already committed everywhere, and unless we approach the problem in a systematic way, with considerable thought, we will simply be paving the way for Mr. Khrushchev in his new and potent tactic—internal war.

The Fate Of Our Country

FORCES AT WORK TODAY

By ARLEIGH BURKE, *Admiral USN, (Ret.)*

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Delivered before the National Press Club, Washington, D. C., August 3, 1961

IT IS A particularly great honor to be invited to talk before the National Press Club, for the members of the press through the years have proved themselves singularly effective in safeguarding the fundamental values and institutions of the American way of life. I have had the privilege and the responsibility of speaking in this room on two previous occasions, and on each occasion I have been impressed, perhaps even more than you, with the importance of this forum.

From the earliest days on record, the members of the press have been in the van of the efforts to mold our nation and to preserve its security. Indeed, even before our nation became a reality, Peter Zenger—with courage and determination—scored an important victory for freedom in the English Colonies. With the political freedom that was soon to follow, the press exerted a vast and continuous impact on the trend of our national affairs. The *Federalist Papers,* for example, had a tremendous influence on the final form of our Constitution and on its ultimate ratification. And surely, as our nation grew, no group of men played a *more* important role in directing our attentions and energies than men like Greeley, Dana, Reid, and Pulitzer.

Thus I feel greatly honored to have this opportunity to speak to the members of the press. You have inherited the proud traditions of your profession, and you bear the grave responsibilities which those traditions impose.

My own career in the naval service has now come to a close. After 42 years of duty—many years of peace, and some

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of war—I am starting my retirement with considerable anticipation. And I know my long-suffering wife shares that anticipation with me. There is no question that retirement brings with it a certain sense of relief. I've sailed with the Navy all my adult life, in fair weather and foul. And as I left her Tuesday, she still remained the finest fighting force the world has ever seen. I am confident she will move out smartly in the future, under the very able leadership of our new Chief of Naval Operations.

I have left my naval duties in the hands of Admiral Anderson. But there are other responsibilities that I can never relinquish: the responsibilities that *every* citizen in our democracy faces. For no matter what our professions may be, no matter whether we are active or retired, each of us bears the responsibilities of his citizenship. Each of us carries his own share of the responsibilities that are fundamental to our concept of government—responsibilities that are dictated by conscience and directed by principles. These responsibilities are not unique to our era. My father and your fathers—all of our forebears—were required to meet the same type of responsibilities. And fortunately for this Republic, history shows that our forebears met them well, met them with wisdom and with the God-given strength that walks hand-in-hand with courage.

Each age faces its own conflicts and its own challenges. But the fundamental fact of our age, a fact blurred neither by symbolism nor by rhetoric, is that the future of the Free World, the conditions of human life for years to come are being determined *now*. The fate of our country—the future existence of our way of life—depends on what we as a nation, what we as individual citizens are willing to do *today*. That is why I would like to discuss briefly some of the forces at work in this troubled world, and how those forces may well affect the lives of our own generation and of generations to follow. Now, I'm not really going to say anything *new* about those forces this afternoon. Nor will I advocate anything you don't *already* believe. But I *do* want to give added emphasis to the seriousness of the present world situation and to the tremendous importance of our taking the steps that President Kennedy called for last week.

Clearly astride our path toward a world of justice and order stands the relentless force of communism, a godless ideology that finds its seat of power and its center of control in the Soviet Union. Now one thing is most apparent about the leaders of the Soviet communist state today. They have become confident—very confident. And with their confidence they have developed arrogance. That is why they are talking tough; that is why Khrushchev has dared to challenge us over Berlin. The reason for this confidence is that some fundamental changes have occurred in Soviet Russia, particularly in the last 5 or 6 years.

Just a little over forty years ago, communism was virtually confined to a rented room in Zurich. When the Bolsheviks seized power they had *nothing*—certainly nothing to be proud of. In every area of the world there were countries with better industries, better schools, better farms, and better housing. The communist leaders felt inferior—and they *were* inferior. But men like Lenin and Stalin were, above all, realists. They recognized this inferiority, and they developed programs to change matters. The fantastic cost of these programs—not just in rubles, but in degradation, deceit, and despair—was of no consequence. The communist hierarchy readily accepted the law that "the end justifies the means." Purges, pogroms, and persecution were integral parts of their five-year plans. Yet these men were as diligent as they were ruthless. They worked hard, with concentration and great singleness of purpose; and now, in the last decade, their plans have begun to pay off.

The Soviet emphasis on scientific training gave birth to Sputnik, to Lunik, and to their man in space. And this scientific skill, combined with espionage and dogged determination, produced the Soviet missile capability: the "rockets" which Khrushchev so often rattles at the Free World. For the first time in Soviet history, they accomplished something before anyone else; and real accomplishment, in *any* society, is the father of confidence. The communists now feel they are better than the rest of the world.

That is *one* reason why they are confident. But there is *another* reason which is just as important. The communists have watched their "enemies" in the West very closely. They have looked for signs of weakness: for weakness in our alliances, for weakness in our decisiveness, for weakness in our will. The communists have probed the soul of the Free World to see if we *really* practice what we preach, if we are *really* willing to stand up for principles—rather than merely spout pious platitudes. They have watched our deeds and ignored our diction. And all too often they found us wanting, our words trailing off to inaction and our opulence expressing itself in complacency.

Many of the communist leaders do not believe that we in the United States will stand up for our principles. They do not believe that we will risk a fight for what we know is right. Menshikov has expressed this attitude very clearly. He stated that ". . . when the chips are down the American people won't fight for Berlin." He would like to promote such a notion.

And so with a growing arrogance born of their *own* confidence and of *our* suspected weakness, Khrushchev has thrown the issue of Berlin in our faces.

But in considering Berlin it is extremely important that we recognize one fact. The future of the half-city of Berlin, this "bone in Khrushchev's throat," is not an issue distinct and separate from the many other pressing international issues that confront our nation. Berlin is isolated geographically, but politically, it is intimately related with everything else that is unfolding in the world: with the communist aggressions in Laos and South Vietnam; with communist exploitation of the situation in Cuba; and with the growing pressures throughout Latin America. The question of the freedom or slavery of West Berlin is a very real part of *all* our relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

It is obvious that these relations are at present based on challenge and response—whether that challenge and that response be in South East Asia, in our own hemisphere, or in Central Europe; and our willingness and ability to respond in one area is directly related to our willingness and ability to meet challenges in other areas.

Even if Khrushchev had not chosen to confront us with this issue at this time and at this place; or if the issue of Berlin becomes not a crisis but an unresolved question, we can be sure that the communists will still continue to present us with other issues, at other times and other places, in their drive toward world empire. Sometimes these issues will be primarily of a military nature. At other times they will be economic, or psychological, or political. But one thing is certain: The patterned policy of communist pressure and conflict will continue at an accelerated rate as long as they can hope that such a policy will be rewarding.

Naturally, of course, our attentions are now focused on Berlin. Our efforts and our energies are directed toward Berlin because the issue is related to far *more* than the hopes and aspirations of 2 million Berliners, far *more* than to the ultimate reunification of a free Germany. Berlin is a symbol—

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